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蘭德評論:拜登的南海政策與美越關系的未來

2021-3-25 16:23| 發布者: Damein| 查看: 9949| 評論: 3|原作者: Damein

摘要: https://wemp.app/posts/2e8acc0d-e098-4100-90c6-96501600ca0c 作者: 德里克·格羅斯曼(Derek Grossman),美國蘭德公司(Rand Corporation)資深研究員,研究方向為美國國家安全政策與印太安全問題。 譯者按 ...
https://wemp.app/posts/2e8acc0d-e098-4100-90c6-96501600ca0c

作者:
德里克·格羅斯曼(Derek Grossman),美國蘭德公司(Rand Corporation)資深研究員,研究方向為美國國家安全政策與印太安全問題。

譯者按
在特朗普的任期內,越南和美國的關系突飛猛進:兩國的貿易總額迅速增加,比十年前翻了74倍;特朗普對越南進行了國事訪問;美國兩次派遣航母訪問越南,并向越南出售軍艦,開啟了越美軍事合作的新篇章。越美之間頻繁的經貿和軍事交往表明,兩國關系進入了一個蜜月期,似乎越南在一夜之間成了美國的準盟友。

然而,美國領導層的更迭給越美關系帶來了一定程度的不確定性??傮w而言,美國對越南的態度是積極的。為了促進印太地區的自由和開放,拜登政府基本上延續了特朗普政府的印太戰略,但在措辭上有所緩和,主要體現在“加強與盟友和合作伙伴的關系”。

越南所處的地理位置及拜登對印太戰略的重視,預示著越美關系仍有極大的發展空間。




對拜登南海政策的預測


越南一向采取謹慎、保守的外交政策,避免極端化手段,尤其注意不與中國產生過多摩擦,但卻是印太戰略的狂熱支持者,種種舉措均表明其利用外交手段打壓中國的意圖。越南胡志明市國家大學國際研究所研究員譚桑亨(Tam Sang Huynh)稱:“由于中國的南海主張與越南存在較大爭議,越南的外交重心正在向美國傾斜?!?br>
此外,越南還表示支持“航行自由”行動。拜登就任美國總統才兩個多月,美國軍艦就已在南沙群島和西沙群島周邊開展了三次“航行自由”行動。美國國務卿布林肯(Antony Blinken)重申了特朗普政府對南海爭議領土的立場。

拜登政府的對華戰略,對越南顯然是有利的。2020年5月白宮發布《對華戰略方針》,聲稱要采取對中國采取全面施壓。拜登在美國國務院發表的外交政策講話中指出,“中國為最嚴峻的競爭者”。他在哥倫比亞廣播公司播出的專訪中表示,中美正處于一種“極端競爭”狀態。拜登政府內部在對華政策上已經形成共識,例如,美國國防部部長奧斯?。↙loyd Austin)在接受采訪時稱中國是美國的“主要威脅”,美國國家安全委員會各部門負責人也已經開始關注中國崛起對美國國家安全的影響。

有分析認為,中美日益加劇的競爭提升了越南的戰略地位,意味著越南和美國有望加強合作,成為美國在印太地區的重要合作伙伴。早期跡象顯示,拜登將延續特朗普政府時期越南和美國之間的戰略接觸,例如,白宮于今年3月3日發布的《臨時國家安全戰略方針》(Interim National Security Strategic Guidance)中明確指出,“我們(美國)將深化與印度的伙伴關系,并愿同新西蘭、新加坡、越南以及其他東盟成員國一道,推動實現共同目標”。

越南與美國合作的障礙



但越南和美國在進一步推進伙伴關系的過程中仍然需要克服一系列障礙。拜登曾多次表示,促進人權和民主將成為其外交政策的主要關注點之一。越南擔心在加強與美國合作對抗中國的同時,會因其人權問題受到美國的批評。

拜登政府是否會以特朗普政府對越南“匯率操縱”的指控及越南購買俄羅斯軍事裝備的行為為由制裁越南,也是越南不得不考慮的因素。越南在2019年發布的《國防白皮書》中闡明了“四不原則”,即“不參加軍事聯盟,不仰仗任何一個國家對抗第三國,不在本土建立外國軍事基地,不使用武力或以武力相威脅”。

再者,越南軍隊主要使用的是俄制武器,越美兩國在軍事技術上的差距可能會成為雙方開展聯防行動的阻礙。上述因素皆可能導致雙邊合作受挫。

據一位越南官員透露,越南高層一直在與白宮商議越南國家主席阮富仲訪問美國的事宜,但由于種種原因,至今尚未談妥。越南國家領導人最近一次訪問美國距今已超過五年,此次訪問未能成行深深地打擊了越南對美國的信任。其次,今年2月美方發布的四方部長級會議聲明沒有明確提及南海問題,這讓越南頗為不安。

結語



白宮于今年3月12日發布的四國峰會聯合聲明可能有利于緩解越南的擔憂。該聲明寫道,美國將繼續重視國際法在海洋領域的作用,全面遵守和執行《聯合國海洋法公約》的所有規則和程序,并促進世界在海洋安全方面的合作,以應對以規則為基礎的海洋秩序面臨的挑戰。即便如此,仍有一些越南官員認為,最近在美國阿拉斯加州安克雷奇舉行的中美“2+2”高層戰略對話或多或少對越美關系產生了負面影響。

鑒于越美關系的積極發展態勢,故上述風險和挑戰均是可控的。拜登政府今后可能會在緩解越南的擔憂上做工作,以進一步鞏固越南對印太戰略的支持。本文認為,邀請阮富仲訪問美國是當務之急。譚桑亨稱:“盡管意識形態和經濟取向等分歧遠未消除,但越美兩國仍存在利益共同點?!?br>
如果拜登政府能夠平衡好越美之間的利益關系,越南可能會對美國保持開放的態度,即便與美國發生戰略性矛盾或沖突,兩國關系也不會輕易動搖。



★ 本文系IPP獨家譯著。本文英文版首發于美國蘭德公司網站,閱讀原文請點擊下方“閱讀原文”。

譯:曾輝,華南理工大學公共政策研究院研究助理。
編輯:IPP傳播



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引用 Damein 2021-3-25 15:12
原文

https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/0 ... administration.html

by Derek Grossman

March 16, 2021

After four years of steadily strengthening U.S.-Vietnam security relations under the Trump administration, the presidential transition to Joe Biden naturally carries some measure of uncertainty for Hanoi. Early signs from the Biden administration, however, are extremely positive for Vietnam. It appears that the Biden team essentially plans to retain the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at keeping the region “free and open” from Chinese coercion, but with toned down rhetoric and additional emphasis on shoring up ties with allies and partners.

As I have argued previously, Vietnam, though it would not state so publicly to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing China, was an avid supporter of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. Hanoi appreciated Washington's focus on the region, particularly on sovereignty disputes that pit it against Beijing in the South China Sea. Vietnam welcomed American support in the form of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and official statements. During its short time in office, the Biden administration has already conducted three publicly disclosed FONOPs in the South China Sea in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands (twice) and the Paracel Islands. Moreover, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed his predecessor Mike Pompeo's July 2020 shift in South China Sea policy to recognize the existence and legality of maritime counterclaimants' exclusive economic zones (EEZs) over China's “Nine-Dashed Line” claim, which is based on historical territorial rights in contravention of international law and norms of behavior.

It is clear that the Biden administration plans to continue the Trump administration's great power competition with China.

Furthermore, it is clear that the Biden administration plans to continue the Trump administration's great power competition with China. This is a good thing for Hanoi because Washington is demonstrating a long-term resolve to push back against Chinese ambitions. In his major foreign policy speech delivered at the State Department on February 4, President Biden argued that China was a “serious competitor.” A few days later, he gave an interview to CBS' “Face the Nation” in which he described a state of “extreme competition” with China. And his entire administration has been in lockstep on China policy. For example, China has become the “pacing threat” for the Pentagon, and every office within Biden's National Security Council—whether technology, health, climate, etc.—is paying close attention to the national security implications of China's rise.

Finally, Hanoi can hang its hat on the Biden administration's recent decision to specifically name Vietnam as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific. In its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” released (PDF) on March 3, the Biden team noted that “We will…work alongside New Zealand, as well as Singapore, Vietnam, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, to advance shared objectives.” It should be no surprise that Vietnam received a distinct and positive mention. At a recent event hosted by the University of Virginia, U.S. Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink said, “I think our interests and our vision of the kind of region and world in which we want to live is almost completely aligned.”

But inevitably, there are numerous Vietnamese concerns that have attended the transition to Biden. First, as I have discussed elsewhere, the Biden administration appears to emphasize not only shared national interests, but values as well, such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. For Hanoi, there is likely a certain amount of trepidation regarding the potential consequences of engaging with a more vocal Washington on these issues, which are extremely sensitive for Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leaders. Additionally, Hanoi likely has concerns about whether the Biden administration will take action against Vietnam for Trump-era allegations that it is a currency-manipulator as well as potential U.S. sanctions against Vietnam for purchasing Russian military equipment under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Also, in my recent discussions with a Vietnamese interlocutor, there are other brewing concerns. One is that Hanoi has been trying to secure a time for the VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to visit the White House and meet with President Biden. The last and only time this happened was in July 2015, and so a summit is well overdue, and an inability for Hanoi to get one this year would be considered a setback. Second, following the Quad ministerial meeting in February, Washington's readout noticeably did not include a mention of the South China Sea issue—a worrying sign for Hanoi.

This, however, may have been ameliorated by the Biden administration's statement after the first-ever Quad summit on March 12. The statement read, “We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in UNCLOS [United Nations Law on the Convention of the Law of the Sea], and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas.” Finally, the Vietnamese interlocutor raised concerns that American and Chinese officials meeting in Anchorage, Alaska on March 18 might signal a “reset” in U.S.-China relations that could, in some way, negatively impact U.S.-Vietnam relations.

All of these challenges, however, are manageable given the significant and positive momentum of bilateral ties. Going forward, the Biden administration may seek to alleviate Vietnamese concerns raised here to further solidify Hanoi's support of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The Biden administration is already off to a strong start, but more can certainly be done, such as inviting General Secretary Trong for a visit to the White House. For its part, Vietnam might keep an open mind about the new administration and be willing to accept potential changes to Washington's approach over the next four years.

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, regular contributor to The Diplomat, and adjunct professor at the University of Southern California.

This commentary originally appeared on The Diplomat on March 16, 2021. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
引用 黑石頭小子 2021-4-2 07:03
當年中國利用美國圍堵蘇聯,也在上世紀八十年代獲得了不少投資等好處,越南現在不過是比照中國當年趁機發展——不過越南還是太小了,
引用 盜火者探花 2021-4-18 11:37
美國支持越南,就是為了越南在南沙鬧事,攪局南海。

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